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COMMERCIAL LAW
I.

INTRODUCTION

During the past year,' New Mexico's appellate courts handed down a
number of rulings which affected New Mexico's commercial laws. The
first section of this survey article examines cases affecting punitive damages
and prejudgment interest. This section also examines cases concerning
statutes of limitation, attorney's fees, modifications of real estate contracts, and government contracts. 2 The second part of the survey article
examines cases dealing with bulk transfers, secured transactions, and
notes. 3 The third part of the survey article examines cases which clarified
indemnification, unfair
certain aspects of agency, partnership, director
4
law.
tax
Mexico
New
and
practice,
trade
II.

CONTRACTS

Punitive Damages
Historically, American courts did not allow recovery of punitive damages in contract cases.' At least six exceptions emerged permitting punitive
damages in a contract cause of action. 6 The first two exceptions were
a marriage contract 7 and a public service contract! Recently, punitive
damages have been recovered when the breach of contract was accom-

A.

1. The survey period ran from September 30, 1989 to August 31, 1990.
2. See infra notes 5-176 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 177-336 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 337-513 and accompanying text.
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1981); John, Formulating Standards for Awards
of Punitive Damages in the Borderland of Contract and Tort, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 2033 (1987).
Courts did not want to disturb the allocation of risks and benefits agreed to by the parties.
6. John, supra note 5, at 2043; McCubbin, Punitive Damages in Contract Actions-Are the
Exceptions Swallowing the Rule?, 20 WASHBURN L.J. 86 (1980).
7. John, supra note 5, at 2043; McCubbin, supra note 6, at 94 (citing Smith v. Hawkins, 120
Kan. 518, 520, 243 P. 1018, 1019 (1926) (where defendant's conduct was fraudulent); Osmun v.
Winters, 30 Or. 177, 46 P. 780 (1896) (where the defendant's conduct was malicious); Sneve v.
Lunder, 100 Minn. 5, 110 N.W. 99 (1907) (where the defendant's conduct was ruthless)). This
exception was very similar to intentional infliction of mental distress and rested more in tort than
contract. Id. (citing Osmun, 30 Or. at 182, 46 P. at 782; D. DOBBS, HADBOOK ON THE LAW OF
REMEDIES § 3.9 n.l (1973)).
8. John, supra note 5, at 2043; McCubbin, supra note 6, at 94 (citing Williams v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., 138 S.C. 281, 136 S.E. 218 (1927) (involving a telephone company); Davis
v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 104 S.C. 63, 88 S.E. 273 (1916) (involving a common carrier);
Woody v. National Bank of Rocky Mount, 194 N.C. 549, 140 S.E. 150 (1927); Birmingham
Waterworks Co. v. Keiley, 2 Ala. App. 629, 56 So. 838 (Civ. App. 1911); Southwestern Gas &
Elec. Co. v. Stanley, 45 S.W. 2d 671 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931), aff'd, 123 Tex. 157, 70 S.W.2d 413
(1934)).
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panied by fraud, 9 an independent tort,' 0 breach of fiduciary duty," or
breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.' 2 Punitive
damages are also allowed when a building or construction contract has
been breached. 3
In determining whether to apply punitive damages to a breach of
contract, New Mexico courts must consider whether the defendant's
conduct was committed maliciously, intentionally, fraudulently, oppressively, recklessly, or with wanton disregard for a plaintiff's rights. 14 New
Mexico also allows punitive damages under a breach of contract suit
when the breach is accompanied by fraud, 5 an independent tort, 6 or a
breach of good faith.' 7 In the past year the New Mexico Supreme Court
addressed whether punitive damages should be allowed in a cause of
action for breach of contract accompanied by a breach of fiduciary
duty.' 8 The court also addressed an award of punitive damages with
regard to employment contracts 19 and building contracts. 20 Finally, in
Romero v. Mervyn's, the supreme court may have eliminated the specific
21
exceptions in favor of one general exception.
In Romero v. Mervyn s,22 the plaintiff, Lucy Romero, fell while shopping at Mervyn's Department Store ("Mervyn's"). The store manager
allegedly told Romero that Mervyn's would pay her medical bills. When
Mervyn's refused to pay the medical bills, Romero brought an action
23
for negligence and breach of contract.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Mervyn's on
the contract claim. The jury absolved Mervyn's of liability under the
negligence claim .24 The supreme court upheld the negligence verdict but
9. See Thompson v. Home Security Life Ins., 271 S.C. 54, 244 S.E.2d 533 (1978); Powers v.
Martinson, 313 N.W.2d 720 (N.D. 1981) (punitive damages properly awarded where defendant
committed fraud in sale of building).
10. Ramsey v. Culpepper, 738 F.2d 1092, 1099 (10th Cir. 1984); Stanback v. Stanback, 297
N.C. 181, 254 S.E.2d 611 (1979).
11. PSG Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 417 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 918 (1970); Mulder v. Mittelstadt, 120 Wis. 2d 103, 352 N.W.2d 223, 230
(Ct. App. 1984).
12. Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206
Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984); Phillips v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 473 F. Supp. 984 (D. Vt. 1979).
13. Annotation, Recovery of Punitive Damages for Breach of Building or Construction Contract,
40 A.L.R.4TH 110, 116-21 (1985).
14. Hood v. Fulkerson, 102 N.M. 677, 681, 699 P.2d 608, 612 (1985) (citing Loucks v. Albuquerque
Nat'l Bank, 76 N.M. 735, 747, 418 P.2d 191, 199 (1966)). In order to sustain an award of punitive
damages, a plaintiff must only prove one of the terms. Romero v. Mervyn's, 109 N.M. 249, 255,
784 P.2d 992, 998 (1989) (citing Green Tree Acceptance, Inc. v. Layton, 108 N.M. 171, 174, 769
P.2d 84, 87 (1989)).
15. Curtiss v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 90 N.M. 105, 560 P.2d 169 (Ct. App. 1976); Stewart v.
Potter, 44 N.M. 460, 104 P.2d 736 (1940)-.
16. Jessen v. National Excess Ins. Co., 108 N.M. 625, 776 P.2d 1244 (1989).
17. Curtiss, 90 N.M. 105, 560 P.2d 169.
18. See Kueffer v. Kueffer, 110 N.M. 10, 791 P.2d 461 (1990).
19. See McGinnis v. Honeywell, Inc., 110 N.M. 1, 791 P.2d 452 (1990).
20. See Foley v. Horton, 108 N.M. 812, 780 P.2d 638 (1989).
21. See Romero v. Mervyn's, 109 N.M. 249, 784 P.2d 992 (1989).
22. 109 N.M. 249, 784 P.2d 992 (1989).
23. Id. at 251, 252, 784 P.2d at 994, 995.
24. Id. at 252, 784 P.2d at 995.
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held the summary judgment on the contract claim improper and remanded

of Romero
it for trial. 25 On remand, the jury returned a verdict in favor 26
on the contract claim and awarded Romero punitive damages. Mervyn's
appealed. 27 The supreme court affirmed, allowing punitive damages as
possible relief in all cases of2 breach of contract where the award would
serve important social ends. 1

In general, recovery is limited to compensatory damages in contract

cases because courts are unwilling to disturb the allocation of risks and
benefits agreed to by the parties. 29 The Romero court noted that punitive
30
damages may be awarded when one of the exceptions discussed above

is found.3 The court stated that malicious or overreaching conduct is
of decency 33
not good for business 32 and violates community standards 34
and thus punitive damages should apply to such conduct.

Thus, the

court set out the following rule: in cases where parties overreach or act

maliciously, it is appropriate for a jury to determine "whether 'the public
interest will be served by the deterrent effect punitive damages will have

upon future conduct.'

'3

The court qualified punitive damages, however,

by stating that the New Mexico rule was never intended 36to allow for
punitive damages in every instance of breach of contract.
The Romero court went on to apply its newly formulated rule to the
facts before it. Under the new rule the court found that a jury could
have believed that when the store manager made the contract with Romero
37
to cover her medical bills, he knew Mervyn's would not honor it. The
court also found that a jury could also believe that the store manager
acted maliciously when he promised that Mervyn's would pay Romero's

trial
medical expenses. 38 The Romero court therefore concluded that the
39
court's jury instructions were supported by substantial evidence.

25. Id. (citing Romero v. Mervyn's, 106 N.M. 389, 744 P.2d 164 (1987)).
26. Romero, 109 N.M. at 252, 784 P.2d at 995.
27. Id. at 258, 784 P.2d at 1001.
28. Id. at 257, 784 P.2d at 1000. The court cited Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. v. Standard
Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 769-70, 686 P.2d 1158, 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 363 (1984), as an
example of serving important social ends. In Seaman's, a California court awarded punitive damages
against a party who adopted a "see you in court" position without a belief in the existence of a
defense. Id. The California court justified its position stating, "Such conduct goes beyond the mere
breach of contract. It offends accepted notions of business ethics. Acceptance of tort remedies in
such a situation is not likely to intrude upon the reasonable expectations of the contracting parties."
Id.
29. Romero, 109 N.M. at 257, 784 P.2d at 1000.
30. Id.; see supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
31. Romero, 109 N.M. at 257, 784 P.2d at 1000.
32. Id. at 258, 784 P.2d at 1001. Thus, the court implied that an award of punitive damages
would promote good business.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. (quoting Vernon Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Sharp, 264 Ind. 599, 608, 349 N.E.2d 173,
180 (1976)).
36. Id. at 256, 784 P.2d at 999.
37. Id. at 258, 784 P.2d at 1001.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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Future applications of the Romero punitive damages rule are unclear.
Should the new rule not be as sweeping as it seems, courts will still
award punitive damages in certain specific instances, including cases where
a breach of contract involves a breach of fiduciary duty, an employment
contract, or a contract to build a home.
In Kueffer v. Kueffer, 4° Kathleen Kueffer sued William C. Kueffer and
Santa Fe Design Associates, Inc. for breach of contract and breach of
fiduciary duty. The Kueffers had divorced and divided their community
assets in a written contract. 4 ' The contract provided that Mr. Kueffer
would act as manager of the couple's interests in a contract with a third
party. 42 Thus, Mr. Kueffer was acting as Ms. Kueffer's fiduciary. 4 The
contract also stipulated that Ms. Kueffer was to be held harmless from
44
any debts incurred by Santa Fe Design Associates, Inc. after July 1987.
Ms. Kueffer sued for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty
when Mr. Kueffer's accountant incorrectly deducted some of Santa Fe
Design Associates, Inc.'s debts from Ms. Kueffer's share of the proceeds
from the sale of the Kueffer's community property after their divorce. 45
The trial court ruled in favor of Ms. Kueffer on the breach of contract
claim." The trial court based its ruling on Mr. Kueffer's improper
deduction of debts from Ms. Kueffer's portion of some net sale proceeds
realized by way of a third party contract. 47 In addressing the breach of
fiduciary duty claim, the trial court ruled in favor of Mr. Kueffer. 4 The
trial court based its ruling on the ambiguity in the Kueffer contract and
the fact that Mr. Kueffer had acted in good faith. 4a The trial court
refused Ms. Kueffer's claims for punitive damages, prejudgment interest,
costs, and fees. 50 Ms. Kueffer appealed. 5
The supreme court held that because the Kueffer marriage contract
was ambiguous, substantial evidence did not support an award of punitive
damages. 5 2 The court noted that Mr. Kueffer interpreted the marriage
contract as only exempting Ms. Kueffer from liability arising after the
marriage contract was signed. 3 The evidence did not show that Mr.
Kueffer's "interpretation of the contract was intentional, malicious, op'5 4
pressive, reckless, or in wanton disregard of Ms. Kueffer's rights."

40. 110 N.M. 10, 791 P.2d 461 (1990).
41. Id. at 11,791 P.2d at 462.
42. Id. The Kueffers shared a 640o interest in the net proceeds from a contract between Santa
Fe Design Associates, Inc. and John Conron. Id. The Kueffer marriage contract provided that this
64% interest would be divided equally between the Kueffers. Id.
43. Id. at 13, 791 P.2d at 464.
44. Id. at 11, 791 P.2d at 462.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 12, 791 P.2d at 463.
47. Id.; see infra note 79.
48. Kueffer, 110 N.M. at 12, 791 P.2d at 463.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 13, 791 P.2d at 464.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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Thus, when a contract is ambiguous, the supreme court will not award
punitive damages.
In addition to exploring an award of punitive damages where a breach
of contract is accompanied by a breach of fiduciary duty, the supreme
court considered the circumstances where breach of an employment con5
tract warrants punitive damages in McGinnis v. Honeywell, Inc. Shirley
McGinnis had been employed as a secretary by Honeywell, Inc. ("Honeywell"). 5 6 When McGinnis applied for her job, she signed an employment agreement which provided that either McGinnis or Honeywell
57
could terminate the employment agreement at any time. In 1982, McGinnis
was promoted to benefits administrator in Honeywell's Human Resources
59
Department. 5" In 1986, McGinnis was laid off. At the time McGinnis
was laid off, Honeywell operated under a work force realignment guide,
which provided McGinnis with the option of resuming her job as a
secretary in the event of a lay off. 60 This option was not offered to
McGinnis.61
McGinnis sued Honeywell and alleged that she 62had been terminated
in violation of Honeywell's policies and procedures. She sought punitive
and compensatory damages from Honeywell for breach of an implied
63
employment contract and retaliatory discharge. The trial court found
in favor of McGinnis on the breach of employment contract and awarded
compensatory damages. The trial court also granted Honeywell a directed64
and punitive damages.
verdict on the claims for retaliatory discharge
65
appealed.
McGinnis
and
Both Honeywell
The New Mexico Supreme Court refused to award punitive damages
for breach of an employment contract where there was no substantial
66
evidence of a culpable mental state on the part of the employer's agents.
In order to collect punitive damages, McGinnis needed to show bad faith
67 Alternatively,
by Honeywell during the course of her employment.
McGinnis needed to show bad faith in the manner and method used by
Honeywell to fire her. 68 McGinnis also needed to show a culpable mental
69
state on the part of Honeywell's agents in laying off McGinnis. The

55. 110 N.M. 1, 791 P.2d 452 (1990).

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 2, 791 P.2d at 453.
Id.
Id. at 3, 791 P.2d at 454.
Id.
Id.

61. Id.

62. Id.
63. Id. at 2, 791 P.2d at 453. Ms. McGinnis' retaliatory discharge claim was based on her
charge that she had been terminated because she had exposed potential fraud at Honeywell and
refused to ignore accounting inconsistencies. Id. at 3-4, 791 P.2d at 454-55.
64. Id. at 2, 791 P.2d at 453.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 9, 791 P.2d at 460.
67. Id.
68. Id. (citing Newberry v. Allied Stores, 108 N.M. 424, 432, 773 P.2d 1231, 1239 (1989)).
69. Id. (citing Gonzales v. Sansoy, 103 N.M. 127, 130, 703 P.2d 904, 907 (Ct. App. 1984)).
The McGinnis court also cited Patton v. Mid-Continent Sys., Inc., 841 F.2d 742, 750 (7th Cir.
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court noted that McGinnis failed to introduce evidence of a culpable
mental state and added that breach of an employment contract did not
necessitate an award of punitive damages. 70

In addition to establishing a standard for awarding punitive damages
for breach of an employment contract, the court considered an award

of punitive damages for breach of a contract to build a home. In Foley

v. Horton,7 Herbert and Roberta Horton ("the Hortons") entered into

a contract with James and Maureen Foley ("the Foleys") to build the
Foleys' home. The trial court found that the Hortons failed to build the

home in a workmanlike manner.7 2 The trial court pointed out that the

home was structurally unsafe and contained building code violations.73
The court went on to award both compensatory and punitive damages
to the Foleys.7 4 The Hortons appealed. 75

The supreme court held that where a builder uses inferior materials

and violates building codes, punitive damages may be awarded. 76 The
court pointed out the following facts: (1) by erecting and locking a gate
at the building cite, the Hortons tried to deprive the Foleys of the
protection of state building code inspection; (2) although the Hortons
were not licensed to install wiring, they installed it and exposed the
Foleys to unnecessary risks; and (3) the Hortons used green timbers,
which became dry and warped and made the house unsafe for its oc-

cupants. 77 Thus, the supreme court found that the facts supported the

trial court's award of punitive damages. 78
B.

Prejudgment Interest
New Mexico awards prejudgment interest for breach of contract as a
matter of right when the amount due is "ascertainable by a mathematical
calculation from a standard fixed in the contract or from established

1988) for the proposition that "the mere breach of a contract does not itself create a right to
punitive damages: even if deliberate, the breach may be justified in some sense if the promisee can
be fully compensated for the loss and the benefit to the promisor from the breach may provide
society with a net gain, i.e., the breach may be 'efficient."' McGinnis, 110 N.M. at 9, 791 P.2d
at 460.
70. Id.
71. 108 N.M. 812, 780 P.2d 638 (1989).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 812-13, 780 P.2d at 638-39.
75. Id. at 813, 780 P.2d at 639.
76. Id. at 814, 780 P.2d at 640. In addition to focusing on punitive damages, the Foley court
considered whether estoppel and waiver prohibited the Foleys from suing the Hortons for breach
of contract. Id. at 813, 780 P.2d at 639. In addressing the waiver issue, the Foley court followed
the principles set out in Pillsbury v. Blumenthal, 58 N.M. 422, 272 P.2d 326 (1954) and Clear v.
Patterson, 80 N.M. 654, 459 P.2d 358 (Ct. App. 1969), and held that acceptance of a house with
latent defects does not bar a cause of action for waiver. Foley, 108 N.M. at 813, 780 P.2d at 639.
The Foley Court also held that the homeowners were not estopped from suing the builder where
the builder failed to rely on the homeowner in breaching a contract. Id.
77. Foley, 108 N.M. at 814, 780 P.2d at 640.
78. Id.
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market prices." 7 9 Furthermore, where indebtedness can be ascertained by
the calculation method, the injured party has the right to collect interest
at the legal rate.80
2
In Kueffer v. Kueffer,8 ' discussed previously,1 the trial court denied
Ms. Kueffer's claim for prejudgment interest. The supreme court pointed
out that the Kueffers' contract set out a mathematical standard when it
defined net proceeds. 8 The Kueffers' marital settlement contract defined
net proceeds as the proceeds limited to land or money received from a
third party contract less any claim the third party had been paid as a
result of a certain development project." The supreme court applied the
New Mexico standard for awarding prejudgment interest, holding that
the trial court erred by not awarding Ms. Kueffer prejudgment interest
85
of 15% annually under New Mexico statute section 56-8-3(B). The court
reasoned that Mr. Kueffer could have subtracted the appropriate costs
86
from the sale proceeds from the third party contract. The court noted
Kueffer to avoid prejudgment
that to rule otherwise would encourage Mr.
87
interest by contesting the amount owed.
Choice of Law/Statute of Limitations
In New Mexico, statutes of limitation are procedural and not substantive
for choice of law purposes. Under the substance-procedure dichotomy,
88
procedural matters are governed by the law of the forum. New Mexico
also allows parties to choose the law that governs their agreement,
including time to sue provisions.8 9 For example, parties may include a
shorter time to sue provision in a contract than is available under New
C.

79. Grynberg v. Roberts, 102 N.M. 560, 562, 698 P.2d 430, 432 (1985)
where agreements between parties set out exact percentages of working
defendant owed and where documents filed with court listed dates, invoice
due per invoice, and total amounts due for each defendant); B. McCarthy
106 N.M. 781, 783, 784, 750 P.2d 1107, 1109, 1110 (1988) (where invoices

requirements);

RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS

(amount is ascertainable
interests and costs each
numbers, exact amounts
Const. v. Seegee Eng'g,
to Seegee met Grynberg

§ 337(a) (1932).

80. Grynberg, 102 N.M. at 562, 698 P.2d at 432. In New Mexico, when there is no written
contract the legal rate of interest is 15% annually on: (1) "money due by contract;" (2) "money
received to the use of another and retained without the owner's consent expressed or implied;"
and (3) "money due upon the settlement of matured accounts from the day the balance is ascertained."

N.M.

STAT. ANN.

§ 56-8-3 (Repl. Pamp. 1986).

81. 110 N.M. 10, 791 P.2d 461 (1990).
82. See supra notes 40-53 and accompanying text.
83. Kueffer, 110 N.M. at 12, 791 P.2d at 463.
84. Id. at 11, 791 P.2d at 462. The third party was an individual named John Conron. Id.
The Kueffer's owned a 64% interest in the net proceeds from a contract between Santa Fe Design
Associates, Inc. and John Conron. Id. The Conron contract concerned the Conron Property
Development Project. Id.
85. Id. at 12, 791 P.2d at 463. Section 56-8-3(B) prohibits an interest rate of more than 1570
annually, unless a written contract fixes a different rate, "on money received to the use of another
and retained without the owner's consent express or implied." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-8-3(B) (Repl.
Pamp. 1986).
86. Kueffer, 110 N.M. at 12, 791 P.2d at 463.
87. Id.
88. Slade v. Slade, 81 N.M. 462, 463, 468 P.2d 627, 628 (1970); Sierra Life Ins. Co. v. First
Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 85 N.M. 409, 413, 512 P.2d 1245, 1249 (1973).
89. Jim v. CIT Fin. Servs. Corp., 87 N.M. 362, 364, 533 P.2d 751, 753 (1975).
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Mexico statutes of limitation. 90 However, the shorter time to sue provision
may not conflict with New Mexico public policy. 9'
In Nez v. Forney,92 Jimmy and Elizabeth Nez ("the Nezes") entered
into a retail installment contract with an auto dealer in El Paso, Texas. 93
The contract was for the purchase of a Ford truck.9 4 The installment
contract listed an El Paso address for the Nezes. 95 The auto dealer assigned
the contract to M Bank, an El Paso bank. 96 The contract contained a
clause which stated that Texas law would govern the contract. 9 After
the Nezes moved to the Navajo reservation in New Mexico, an employee
of Max Forney repossessed the truck. 98 Forney and his employee were
acting as agents for M Bank. 99 The Nezes sued for conversion, wrongful
repossession, an unfair trade practice violation, and violation of Navajo
° They
Tribal Code section 607.10
asked for punitive damages under the
0
conversion count.' ' The trial court granted summary judgment in favor
of Forney and M Bank, and the Nezes appealed. 01 2
On appeal, the supreme court held that "choice of law provisions must
specifically describe remedial limitations, if such aspects are to be covered
in addition to substantive aspects of the contract."' 13 The court also held
that a New Mexico statute of limitations should have been applied by
the trial court.' °4 In arriving at this holding, the court addressed two
issues. First, the court addressed the issue of whether parties to a contract
have a right to include remedial law in a choice of law agreement. 0 5
Second, the court considered whether the district court should have applied
the New Mexico or the Texas statute of limitations.' °6
After setting out the established New Mexico law for choice of law
purposes, 0 7 the court noted that the choice of law provision only set
out that the retail installment contract would be governed by Texas law. 0
The court also noted that the contract did not include a specific statute

90. See, e.g. Turner v. New Brunswick Fire Ins. Co., 45 N.M. 126, 112 P.2d 511 (1941) (holding
that a contract with a one year statute of limitations, which shortened a six year limitations period,
was not void).
91. Sandoval v. Valdez, 91 N.M. 705, 707, 580 P.2d 131, 133 (Ct. App. 1978).
92. 109 N.M. 161, 783 P.2d 471.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 162, 783 P.2d at 472.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 163, 783 P.2d 473.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See supra notes 57-60. After setting out the law of New Mexico, the court stated that New
Mexico's law was consistent with Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988), where the Supreme
Court held that statutes of limitation are procedural. Nez, 109 N.M. at 162, 783 P.2d at 472.
108. Nez, 109 N.M. at 162, 783 P.2d at 472.
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of limitations/time to sue provision.'09 Finally, the court limited the Nezes'
choice of law provision to substantive matters." 0 The court concluded
that the trial court should have applied the New Mexico statute of
limitations "because New Mexico courts should apply the forum state's
statute of limitations.""'
D. Attorney's Fees
Under New Mexico law, litigants are responsible for their own attorney's
fees unless statutory or other authority, such as contract terms, provide
otherwise." '2 When contracting parties allocate fees in their contract, the
3 Thus,
contract controls the award of attorney's fees if a dispute arises."
4
contract interpretation determines what fees are authorized."
In Montoya v. Villa Linda Mall, Ltd.," 5 David and Elizabeth Montoya
("the Montoyas") agreed to lease retail space from Villa Linda Mall
("the Mall")." 6 The Montoyas occupied the space from July 1985 until
June 1986."'7 The Montoyas alleged that prior to entering the lease
agreement, the Mall misrepresented the projected occupancy of the mall
and mall promotional activities.' ' 8 The Mall subsequently relet the space.' 9
The lease contract contained an article which provided that if either party
12
sued on the lease, the losing party would pay attorney's fees.

109. Id.
110. Id. Faced with two applicable statutes of limitation, the court held that Mr. and Mrs. Nez
were not barred from filing suit under either statute. Id. at 163, 783 P.2d at 473. In a concurring
opinion, Justice Montgomery disagreed with the majority opinion's rationale. Id. at 164, 783 P.2d
at 474 (Montgomery, J., concurring). Although Justice Montgomery agreed that Sun Oil stands for
the proposition that statutes of limitation are procedural, he pointed out that Sun Oil also stands
for the notion that statutes of limitation may be procedural and substantive, under differing contexts.
Id. Justice Montgomery wrote that the Supreme Court stated that statutes of limitation can be
substantive or procedural depending on whether the issue concerns conflict of laws, full faith and
credit, or the Erie doctrine. Id. Justice Montgomery wrote that the differences between substance
and procedure should decide the Nez case. Id. Justice Montgomery might have proposed a relation
test as the criteria for deciding which forum's statute of limitations is appropriate. Id. Furthermore,
Justice Montgomery did not agree that a choice of law provision needed to describe remedial
limitations. Id. Justice Montgomery opined that the statement "this contract shall be governed by
the laws of the State of Texas" should govern all disputes under the contract. Id. Justice Montgomery
also stated that Mr. and Mrs. Nez should be given the benefit of New Mexico law because they
were New Mexico residents suing in New Mexico court for violations of New Mexico law. Id. at
165, 783 P.2d at 475.
111. Id. at 163, 783 P.2d at 473.
112. McClain Co., Inc., v. Page & Wirtz Constr. Co., 102 N.M. 284, 694 P.2d 1349 (1985).
McClain does not stand for the proposition that a breaching party who prevails at trial cannot be
awarded attorney's fees. Montoya v. Villa Linda Mall, 110 N.M. 128, 131, 793 P.2d 258, 261
(1990).
113. See Dennison v. Marlowe, 108 N.M. 524, 526-27, 775 P.2d 726, 728-29 (1989).
114. Id.
115. 110 N.M. 128, 793 P.2d 258 (1990).
116. Id. at 128-29, 793 P.2d 258-59.
117. Id. at 129, 793 P.2d 259.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. The specific article reads as follows:
In the event that at any time during the term of this lease eiiher Landlord or
Tenant shall institute any action or proceeding against the other relating to the
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The Montoyas sued the Mall for negligent misrepresentation and constructive fraud.' 2 ' The Mall counterclaimed for past rent based on a
breach of the lease. 22 At trial, the Montoyas did not pursue any claims
based on the lease. 23 The district court ruled in favor of the Montoyas
on the negligent misrepresentation and constructive fraud claims and
awarded the Montoyas $42,825 in attorney's fees to be paid by the
Mall. 124 The court denied the Mall's claim for $5,000 in attorney's fees. 25
The Mall appealed the district court's award of attorney's fees. 126
The New Mexico Supreme Court upheld the district court's award of
attorney's fees under the lease. 127 The court stated that where one party
to a contract acts such that it precipitates a breach, a court has discretion
to allow the prevailing party to recover attorney's fees despite its breach. 121
The court then considered whether this particular contract provision
authorized attorney's fees for an action sounding in tort. 29 An interpretation of the contractual provision authorizing attorney's fees to a
prevailing party was essential to determining the case. 30 The court pointed
out that the language of the contractual provision included suits based
on tort claims which related directly to the contract.'
Although the
Montoyas' claims were in tort, the claims directly related to the leased
space.3 2 The court based its rationale on the portion of the lease's
attorney's fees article that stated, "relating to the provisions of this lease,
or any default hereunder."' 33 The court specifically pointed to the use
of the word "or" and stated that it ordinarily has disjunctive meaning. 3 4
Thus, the court stated that attorney's fees could be awarded for causes
of action relating to the lease "or" to default under the lease. 13 5
E.

Government Contracting
During the past year, the New Mexico Supreme Court ruled on two
cases where private entities entered into contracts with governments. Scott

provisions of this lease, or any default hereunder, then, and in that event, the
unsuccessful party in such action or proceeding agrees to reimburse the successful
party for the reasonable expenses of attorney's fees and disbursements incurred
therein by the successful party.

Id.
121. Id.at 128, 793 P.2d at 258.
122. Id
123. Id. at 129, 793 P.2d at 259.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 131, 793 P.2d at 261.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 129, 793 P.2d at 259.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 130, 793 P.2d at 260.
134. Id. (citing First Nat'l Bank v. Bernalillo County Valuation Protest Bd., 90 N.M. 110, 112,
560 P.2d 174, 176 (Ct. App. 1977)).
135. Id.
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36
v. Board of Commissioners of the County of Los Alamos considered

whether the assessment of liquidated damages, pursuant to a contract,
for untimely performance provided the basis for a claim under the Civil
Rights Act. In Gardner-Zemke Co. v. State,3 7 the New Mexico Supreme

Court considered whether the trial court properly ruled that a soil report
made part of a contract was unambiguous as a matter of law. The
Gardner-Zemke court interpreted a changed condition clause.
1. Due Process and Government Contracting

The Civil Rights Act 38 provides a cause of action to people who are
wrongly deprived of property by another person under the guise of a

federal, state or municipal law. 139 In order for a cause of action to exist
under the Civil Rights Act, a court must determine whether the following

elements are present: "(1) whether the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) whether this
conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or14 immunities secured
by the Constitution or laws of the United States."' 0
4
In Scott v. Board of Commissioners of the County of Los Alamos,' ,

Marc Scott contracted with the Board of Commissioners of the County
of Los Alamos ("the Commissioners") and others to build a new entrance
to the municipal annex building in Los Alamos. 142 The contract was to
be completed on October 9, 1986, 120 days from June 11, 1986, its date

of receipt.

43

The contract provided for damages of $250 per day for

44
every day construction extended beyond the scheduled completion day.
The project was substantially completed seventeen days late and the county

assessed damages of $8,000.141
Scott sued for various tort and contract claims, including a substantive

due process claim under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act.'" The
47

district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Commissioners.

109 N.M. 310, 785 P.2d 221 (1989)..
109 N.M. 729, 790 P.2d 1010 (1990).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 reads:
[E]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
140. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams,
474 U.S. 327 (1986).
141. 109 N.M. 310, 785 P.2d 221 (1989).
142. Id.at 311, 785 P.2d at 222.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 310, 785 P.2d 221.
136.
137.
138.
139.
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The district court found that section
1983 did not apply to a breach of
49
contract claim. 4 ' Scott appealed.
The Supreme Court of New Mexico upheld the trial court, finding
that Scott's contract claim involved liquidated damages, which clearly
would not rise to the level of a deprivation of a civil right that may be
remedied by section 1983.150 The court reasoned that Scott had a cognizable
property interest under state law.' 5 ' The court stated that possession of
a cognizable property interest does not give a party the right to sue
under the Civil Rights Act. 5 2 The court noted that the Civil Rights Act
does not give a remedy for all wrongs committed under state law. 5 3 The
court went on to state that deprivation of property without procedural
due process by state officials is not an applicable cause of action if state
law can remedy the breach. 5 4 Otherwise, every breach of contract suit
would become a constitutional case if deprivation of property without
due process were alleged. 5 Thus, the court held that procedural due
process was not an issue because the state provided a remedy for Scott's
56
cause of action. 1
The court then considered whether Scott had a substantive due process
claim. For a substantive due process claim to exist, a plaintiff must allege
a deprivation of a state-created property interest and a violation of another
constitutional right. 57 The court noted that Scott failed to allege that
Los Alamos County's action affected one of Scott's liberty interests.'
Thus, the court stated that a claim for liquidated damages could not be
classified as a deprivation of a civil right under the Civil Rights Act. 59
As a result of the court's ruling, causes of action under the Civil Rights
Act can no longer be brought against the state for breach of contract.
2. Reporting Discrepancies to Government
In New Mexico, pre-bid documents integrated into a contract are
interpreted under accepted rules of contract law. For example, misleading
pre-bid documents are a breach of the implied warranty of correctness.' 60
Moreover, whether a contract must be adjusted because of a change in
conditions is a question of law.' 6'

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 311, 785 P.2d at 222.
Id. at 310, 785 P.2d at 221.
Id. at 313, 785 P.2d at 224.
Id. at 312, 785 P.2d at 223 (citing Logun v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 313, 785 P.2d at 224.
Id.
Id.
See Vinnell Corp. v. State, 85 N.M. 311, 512 P.2d 71 (1973).
See T.F. Scholes, Inc. v. United States, 357 F.2d 963 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
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In Gardner-Zemke Co. v. State, 62 the Gardner-Zemke Company
("Gardner-Zemke") entered into a contract with the State of New Mexico
to help build the Las Cruces Medium Security Facility. 63 The bid documents sent to Gardner-Zemke contained a soil report. 64 Defendant Fox
& Associates, Inc. prepared the soil report. 65 Gardner-Zemke relied in
part on the soil report in calculating its bid.' 6 Gardner-Zemke interpreted
the report to state that the soil consisted primarily of sand. 67 Because
portions of the soil actually contained limestone and caliche rather than
sand, the trenching costs incurred by Gardner-Zemke were higher than
expected.' l As a result, Gardner-Zemke sued for its excess costs under
the contract's changed condition clause. 69 The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the state and Gardner-Zemke appealed.' 70
On appeal, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that because GardnerZemke failed to notice the contradictions between the narrative and
technical sections of the soil report and failed to report the discrepancy
to the government, Gardner-Zemke's claim could not prevail. 7 ' The court
found that the pre-bid documents, including the soil report, were part
of the contract.' 72 The court then explained that success on a changed
162. 109 N.M. 729, 790 P.2d 1010 (1990).
163. Id. at 730, 790 P.2d at 1011.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.at 731, 790 P.2d at 1012.
169. Id. The clause provided that the contract could be equitably adjusted if subsurface conditions
differed materially from what the contractor reasonably expected. Id.
170. Id. at 730, 790 P.2d at 1011.
171. Id. at 735, 790 P.2d at 1016 (citing Beacon Constr. Co. v. United States, 314 F.2d 501
(Ct. Cl. 1963)).
172. Id. at 733, 790 P.2d at 1014. As part of the contract, the court stated that the pre-bid
documents should be interpreted under the following canons of contract construction:
1. Interpretation of a contract to determine whether a condition encountered is a
changed condition allowing an equitable adjustment of the contract is a question
of law. Id. (citing T.F. Scholes, Inc. v. United States, 357 F.2d 963 (Ct. Cl. 1966)).
2. Whether an ambiguity exists is a question of law. Id. (citing Levenson v. Mobley,
106 N.M. 399, 744 P.2d 174 (1987)).
3. If the contract is found to be ambiguous, the meaning of the ambiguous terms
is a question of fact. Id. (citing Segura v. Molycorp, Inc., 97 N.M. 13, 636 P.2d
284 (1981)).
4. The drafter of a document must use language conveying its intent. If the language
has more than one interpretation, it is interpreted against the drafter. Id.. (citing
Smith v. Tinley, 100 N.M. 663, 674 P.2d 1123 (1984)).
5. The rule stated in Smith applies only where courts cannot otherwise ascertain
the intent of the parties. Id. (citing El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Western Bldg.
Assocs., 675 F.2d 1135 (10th Cir. 1982)).
6. A contract is not automatically ambiguous where a disagreement over the meaning
of specification exists. A contract must be susceptible to various interpretations and
the contractor's interpretation has to be reasonable. Id. See Levenson, 106 N.M.
at 401, 744 P.2d at 176; see also Major v. Bishop, 462 F.2d 1277 (10th Cir. 1972).
7. A reasonable interpretation is consistent with the language of the contract. Courts
must consider the language of the entire contract and cannot depend on selected
portions of the contract to support a finding of ambiguity. Gardner-Zemke Co.,
109 N.M. at 734, 790 P.2d at 1015 (citing Lindbeck v. Bendziunas, 84 N.M. 21,
498 P.2d 1364 (Ct. App. 1972)).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21

condition claim requires a showing that the contractor was "reasonably
unaware" the condition existed. 173 A contractor is "reasonably unaware"
of a changed condition if: (1) the contractor relied on representations
made about the site; or (2) was the victim of a hidden condition. 74 The75
court noted that Gardner-Zemke failed to read the whole contract.

Thus, the court ruled that Gardner-Zemke could not argue it was reasonably unaware
of conditions set out in the unread portion of the
76
contract. 1
III.

BULK TRANSFERS

The Bulk Transfers Act ("the Act")

77

is necessary to help prevent

fraudulent transfers of commercial property.7 8 The notice requirement
included in the Act 79 is essential to avert fraudulent transfers because
it allows creditors to investigate transfers to determine whether the creditors should take action to protect their interests. 180 When the seller of

commercial property has not followed the notice requirement in the Act,' 8'
the Act provides that the "transfer" is "ineffective" as to creditors of

173. Gardner-Zenke Co., 109 N.M. at 734, 790 P.2d at 1015.
174. Id. (citing J. McBRMDE & I. WACHTEL, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS § 29.20
(Rev'd 1989)).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Bulk Transfers Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 55-6-101 to -110 (Supp. 1991).
178. Id. § 55-6-101, official comment 2.
179. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-6-104 (Cum. Supp. 1991) is the notice requirement
within the Bulk Transfers Act. It states as follows:
(1) Except as provided with respect to auction sales (Section 6-107 [55-6-107 NMSA
1978]), a bulk transfer subject to this article is ineffective against any creditor of
the transferor unless:
(a) the transferee requires the transferor to furnish a list of his existing creditors
prepared as stated in this section; and
(b) the parties prepare a schedule of the property transferred sufficient to
identify it;
(c) the transferee preserves the list and schedule for six months next following
the transfer and permits inspection of either or both and copying therefrom at all
reasonable hours by any creditor of the transferor, or files the list and schedule
in the office of the secretary of state and, in addition, if the debtor has a place
of business in only one county of this state, also in the office of the county clerk
of such county, or, if the debtor has no place of business in this state, but resides
in the state, also in the office of the county clerk of the county in which he resides.
(2) The list of creditors must be signed and sworn to or affirmed by the transferor
or his agent. It must contain the names and business addresses of all creditors of
the transferor, with the amounts when known, and also the names of all persons
who are known to the transferor to assert claims against him even though such
claims are disputed. If the transferor is the obligor of an outstanding issue of
bonds, debentures or the like as to which there is an indenture trustee, the list of
creditors need include only the name and address of the indenture trustee and the
aggregate outstanding principal amount of the issue.
(3) Responsibility for the completeness and accuracy of the list of creditors rests
on the transferor, and the transfer is not rendered ineffective by errors or omissions
therein unless the transferee is shown to have had knowledge.
180. Id. § 55-6-101, official comment 3.
181. Id. § 55-6-104.
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the seller."8 2 In other words, creditors of the seller may execute against
the property of the buyer after the sale has been made.
During the survey period, the supreme court addressed the issue of
proper notice pursuant to the Bulk Transfers Act and interpreted language
in the Act in favor of future creditors. In Professional Insurors, Inc. v.
Buck Scott & Son Motor Co., Inc.,"83 Professional Insurors, Inc. ("Professional Insurors") brought suit against Buck Scott & Son Motor Company ("Buck Scott Motors"), Buck and Claravon Scott ("the Scotts"),
and Richard Blanken to recover for insurance premiums owed by Buck
Scott Motors following a bulk transfer of the corporate assets to Blanken. '8
In July 1986, Buck Scott Motors agreed to sell its corporate assets to
Blanken. 85 In October 1986, Blanken sent notice to the creditors of Buck
Scott Motors according to the Bulk Sales Act; however, there was some
question as to the accuracy of this notice. 8 6 The notice listed Buck Scott
Motors' total debt as $495,000, but the actual amount of the debt exceeded
one million dollars. 8 7 The notice also listed the consideration to be paid
by Blanken to Buck Scott Motors as $562,000, even though Blanken
actually paid $778,000 in consideration. 8 8 The discrepancies resulted from
the omission of $801,380 owed to one of Buck Scott Motors' creditors,
Barclays American/Financial, Inc. ("Barclays"). 8 9 On the notice sent to
the creditors, the amount owed to Barclays was listed as "unknown."' 19
After the sale, Buck Scott Motors immediately paid Barclays the total
$778,000 received from Blanken from the sale of the assets. 19' Therefore,
no funds were available from the proceeds of the sale to pay any of
the other creditors listed on the notice. 92 Professional Insurors was one
of the other creditors listed on the notice. 93
Professional Insurors brought suit against Buck Scott Motors and
Blanken to recover the debt. 94 The district court granted Blanken summary
judgment on Professional Insurors' claim of defective notice under the
Act. 195 Professional Insurors appealed the judgment.'9
The New Mexico Supreme Court broke down the major issue of whether
proper notice was given into two issues.' 97 The first issue involved determining whether Blanken actually knew the amount of the "unknown"

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id. § 55-6-105.
110 N.M. 299, 795 P.2d 991 (1990).
Id. at 300, 795 P.2d at 992.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 301, 795 P.2d at 993.
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debt to Barclays. 9 The second issue was the determination of whether
the Act was properly followed. 199
In addressing the first issue, the court stated that the Act requires the
amount of the debt owed to any creditor to be listed when the amount
is known. 20 The court determined that Blanken admittedly had notice
that Barclays was a creditor and that he had knowledge of the relative
size of the debt. 201 Blanken argued that he was required to know the
precise amount of the debt. 2 2 The court decided that "[t]his burden . . .
would be too exacting. He (transferee) may not have had knowledge of
the exact amount of the debt, but we find that to be irrelevant." 20 a
Because Blanken had knowledge of the relative size of the debt, he was
obligated to provide a reasonable estimate of the debt. 204 Blanken could
not hide behind the claim that the exact amount of the debt was unascertainable .205
In addressing the second issue, the court determined that the notice
was improper and ineffective. 206 Rather than giving the creditor warning
that steps might need to be taken in order to protect its interest, the
notice lulled the creditor into a false sense of security. 20 7 The notice gave
the appearance that debts would be payable out of the proceeds of the
transaction and induced the creditor to sit by passively. 208 Therefore, the
court held that "a transferee cannot turn a blind eye to the circumstances
surrounding the transaction to the detriment of creditors, and we believe
the principle regarding sufficiency of notice applies to this case.''209 Thus,
the court reversed the summary judgment of the district court and re210
manded the case for trial in accordance with the above principles.
IV.

SECURED TRANSACTIONS

A.

Commercially Reasonable Disposition of Secured Collateral
The New Mexico Supreme Court addressed the commercial reasonableness of a sale of secured collateral when a debtor has defaulted in
First National Bank of Dona Ana County v. Ruttle. 21' The Ruttle court

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id.
Id.
Id.; see supra note 158.
Buck Scott, 110 N.M. at 301, 795 P.2d at 993.
Id. at 302, 795 P.2d at 994.
Id.
Id. at 304, 795 P.2d at 996.
Id. at 303, 795 P.2d at 995.
Id. at 303-04, 795 P.2d at 995-96.
Id. at 304, 795 P.2d at 996.
Id.
Id.

210. Id.

211. 108 N.M. 687, 778 P.2d 434 (1989).
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factors preevaluated the reasonableness of a foreclosure sale based on
Inc. v. Young. 212

viously established in Villella Enterprises,

In Ruttle, the First National Bank of Dona Ana County ("First National") secured six pieces of equipment belonging to John Ruttle in
return for Ruttle's promise to pay a promissory note. 213 Ruttle did not
pay the promissory note and First National repossessed the six pieces of
equipment. 2 4 First National then sold five of the six pieces of equipment

at a public auction." 5 First National sold the sixth piece of equipment,
a tractor, at a private sale to a company in the business of buying and

selling new and used equipment. 2 6 The amounts received from the above
sales were not enough to sufficiently cover the balance of the promissory
note owed by Ruttle.21 7 Therefore, First National sued Ruttle for the

deficiency. 218 The district court entered a deficiency judgment in favor
of First National.2 19 Ruttle appealed the trial court's finding that the
equipment was sold for commercially reasonable amounts. 220 In his appeal,
Ruttle argued that First22 National failed to provide written notice of the
sale of the equipment. '
The supreme court acknowledged that failure to provide written notice
is not an absolute bar to a deficiency judgment. 222 New Mexico law
a public sale
requires "reasonable notification" of the time and place of
223
made.
be
to
is
sale
private
a
which
after
date
the
of
or

212. 108 N.M. 33, 766 P.2d 293 (1988). The court in Villella established that "every aspect of
the disposition of the collateral, including the method, manner, time, place, and terms must be
commercially reasonable, and that reasonable notification of the time and place of any public sale
shall be sent by the secured party to the debtor." Id. at 35, 766 P.2d at 295. Furthermore, the
court stated that in determining commercial reasonableness, "each case will turn on its particular
facts; but, generally, in response to a motion for summary judgment, evidence adduced by the
debtor as to any aspect of the sale . . . will be pertinent." Id.
213. Ruttle, 108 N.M. at 688, 778 P.2d at 435.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.at 689, 778 P.2d at 436.
221. Id. Ruttle also argued that First National sold the equipment at a value that was below the
equipment's market value, and that the means of the disposition was not in accordance with N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 55-9-504(3). Id. Furthermore, Ruttle complained that First National had: (1) insufficiently advertised prior to the auction; (2) failed to negotiate over the auctioneer's fee; (3) failed
to wash or paint the equipment sold at auction in order to secure the best price; and (4) would
only accept cash or a certified check at the time of sale. Id.
The court examined the evidence and decided that there was substantial evidence that the price
received for the collateral was commercially reasonable, and the disposition of the collateral was
commercially reasonable. Id. at 690, 778 P.2d at 437.
222. Id. at 689, 778 P.2d at 436.
223. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-9-504(3) (1978) provides:
Unless collateral is perishable or threatens to decline speedily in value or is of a
type customarily sold on a recognized market, reasonable notification of the time
and place of any public sale or reasonable notification of the time after which any
private sale or other intended disposition is to be made shall be sent by the secured
party to the debtor, if he has not signed after default a statement renouncing or
modifying this right to notification of sale.
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In this case, First National did not give the proper notice. 22A Nevertheless, despite First National's non-compliance with the notice provision, 225 First National could still secure a deficiency judgment if First
National proved the market value of the collateral. 226 Ruttle did not argue
that First National failed to prove the market value of the collateral by
introduction of appropriate independent evidence. 227 Rather, he argued
that failure to give proper notice rendered the sale commercially unreasonable and requested a conclusion of law that First National was barred
from asserting any deficiency because of the commercially unreasonable
sale. 228 The court ruled that Ruttle waived the right to raise on 229appeal
the absence of proof of the fair market value of the collateral.
In effect, the court decided that arguing insufficient compliance with
the notice provision is not enough. 2a0 The debtor must also assert and
provide evidence that the secured party sold the collateral property for
less than the market value of the collateral. 231 To merely argue the first
tier of the improper notice requirement will not suffice when trying to
23 2
prove that a secured party has not complied with the notice provision.
Ruttle did not properly make his argument to the court concerning
the notice requirement, and by applying the standards first provided in
Villella Enterprises, Inc. v. Young, 233 the Ruttle court concluded that
there was substantial evidence of commercial reasonableness as to each
aspect of the sale on which Ruttle purportedly adduced evidence to 235
the
contrary. 2 4 Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's ruling.
B.

Classification of Capital Retains in UCC and Proper Description
in a Financing Statement
During the survey period, the supreme court determined that a capital
retains account should be classified as a "general intangible" when
determining priority between two subordinate lienholders. 2 6 The court
also adopted the rule that the description of collateral in a financing
statement which states "all accounts and contract rights arising from the

224. Ruttle argued that the sale of the six pieces of equipment at issue did not comply with
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-9-504(3) because he was not notified at all as to the private sale of the
tractor, nor given written notice of the sale of the other equipment at auction. Ruttle, 108 N.M.
at 689, 778 P.2d at 436. Ruttle did testify that although he knew his property was being stored
by the auction company and heard about the auction on the radio several days in advance, he
never received notice from the bank that his property was among that to be sold. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. (citing Clark Leasing Corp. v. White Sands Forest Prods., Inc., 87 N.M. 451, 456, 535
P.2d 1077, 1082 (1975)).
227. Id. at 690, 778 P.2d at 437.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Villella, 108 N.M. at 35, 766 P.2d at 295.
234. Ruttle, 108 N.M. at 691, 778 P.2d at 438.
235. Id.
236. Valley Fed. Say. Bank v. Stahl, 110 N.M. 169, 172, 793 P.2d 851, 854 (1990).
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sale or other disposition of . . .dairy products" is sufficient to put third
23 7
parties on inquiry notice of a prior encumbrance on capital retains.

In Valley Federal Savings Bank v. Stahl,28 Vernon and Marcia Stahl
were members of the Associated Milk Producers ("the Cooperative"), a
cooperative association. 23 9 The Stahls had accumulated a balance of over
$100,000 in their capital retains account. 24° The Stahls also owed the
Cooperative over $70,000 for equipment purchased in July of 1984.241
Because the Stahls owed the Cooperative $70,000, the Cooperative's bylaws
reserved to the Cooperative a first lien upon the Stahls' capital retains
to the extent of any claim the Cooperative had against them. 242 To further

evidence the Cooperative's interest in the equipment, the Stahls signed
a security agreement with the Cooperative. 243 The security interest was
perfected by the Cooperative's filing of financing statements on August

20, 1984.2 44 The description of the collateral included: "All equities issued
or to be issued by [Associated Milk Producers]. "241 The Cooperative
2
claimed that the description describes the Stahls' capital retains account. 4
The Stahls also owed money to the Bank of America ("the Bank"),
and incident to the loan agreements between the Stahls and the Bank,
the Stahls granted to the Bank a security interest in collateral described

in the financing statement as "all accounts and contract rights arising
from the sale or other disposition of ... dairy products. ' 24 7 This security
interest was also perfected by way of filing financing statements with
the county clerk on December 7, 1983.248
249 A third party2 0
The Stahls subsequently defaulted on their debts.

induced the original action against the Stahls to collect money due and

to foreclose on a real estate mortgage and personal property liens. 21 The

district court originally held that2 2 the Bank's security interest had priority
over the Cooperative's interest.

237. Id. at 173, 793 P.2d at 855.
238. 110 N.M. 169, 793 P.2d 851 (1990).
239. Id. at 170, 793 P.2d at 852. For purposes of this article, the terms "cooperative association"
or "cooperative" refer to a combination of persons, either natural or artificial, organized on a
cooperative basis for the mutual benefit of its members. Members are also entitled to the association's
net earnings or net proceeds in proportion to the volume of business transacted by each of the
members.
240. Id. In other words, the Stahls were entitled to over $100,000 of the cooperative's past net
profits.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 170-71, 793 P.2d at 852-53.
248. Id.at 171, 793 P.2d at 853.
249. Id. at 170, 793 P.2d at 852.
250. The third party originally bringing this action was Valley Federal Savings Bank. Id. at 169,
793 P.2d at 851.
251. Id.
252. Id.
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The trial court based its decision on the fact that the Bank perfected
its security interest on December 7, 1983, whereas the security interest
of the Cooperative was perfected at the later date of August 20, 1984.253
The Cooperative appealed the trial court's grant of priority in the capital
retains to the Bank. 254 The supreme court considered the issue of priority
in the capital retains account between 255the two lienholders, Associated
Milk Producers and Bank of America.

The Cooperative first argued that the trial court incorrectly concluded
that the Stahls had rights in and to their capital retains that could be
made subject to a lien (i.e., the Cooperative argued that capital retains
were not property of the Stahls in which they could grant a security
25 7
interest).256 The supreme court disagreed with the Cooperative's logic.
The court stated that capital retains are income to the member in the
form of an equity interest, and that capital retains are subject to the
claims of creditors. 25 The capital retains account was classified as a
"general intangible.' '259
The Cooperative then asserted that its security agreement was first in
priority because "accounts and contract rights" as used in the Bank's
financing statement of December 7, 1983 did not adequately describe the
capital retains account. 260 The court weighed this argument by considering
the questions of attachment, 26' perfection, 262 and priority 263 of the two
liens as governed by article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 264 The
court determined that the Bank's interest in the capital retains had
attached. 265 Furthermore, the court concluded that the Bank would have

253. Id. at 171, 793 P.2d at 853.
254. Id. at 169, 793 P.2d at 851.
255. Id. at 170, 793 P.2d at 852.
256. Id. at 171, 793 P.2d at 853.
257. Id.
258. Id. The court stated that a member's right to payment of the capital retains is governed
by the bylaws of the Association. Id. (citing In re Shiflett, 40 Bankr. 493, 495 (W.D. Va. 1984)).
Furthermore, the court stated that the Cooperative's bylaws allowed the Cooperative to "retain
from the proceeds received with respect to the sale of products marketed for each patron an amount
which is fixed without reference to net earnings" and which "shall be considered a capital contribution." Id. From this the court deduced that the capital retains were a property interest to the
Stahls. Id.
259. Id. A general intangible is "any personal property (including things in action) other than
goods, accounts, chattel paper, documents, instruments and money." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-9-106
(Repl. Pamp. 1987).
260. Stahl, 110 N.M. at 171, 793 P.2d at 853.
261. Id. at 172, 793 P.2d at 854. A security agreement is enforceable against the debtor once
the agreement has attached and then been perfected. Id. For a security agreement to attach, the
debtor must have rights in the collateral. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-9-203(l)(c) (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
Thus, because the court held capital retains to be property, the debtor may grant a security interest
in capital retains.
262. Stahl, 110 N.M. at 172, 793 P.2d at 854. Perfection of any security interest is dependent
upon an adequate filing. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 55-9-302(1) to -305 (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
263. Stahl, 110 N.M. at 172, 793 P.2d at 854. Priority pertains to the question of who attached
and perfected their interest in the property first. Id.
264. Id. Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code specifically applies to general intangibles.
See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-9-103(3) (Repl. Pamp. 1987).
265. Stahl, 110 N.M. at 172, 793 P.2d at 854.
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priority if the financing statement was adequately filed. 26 Therefore, the
main issue before the court was whether the Bank's description of the
collateral was proper so as to put third parties on inquiry notice of the
267
existence of a security agreement.
The court stated that whether the description of the collateral was
adequate was a question of law and not a question of fact. 26 The court
determined that the description in the financing statement sufficiently put
third parties on inquiry notice of a prior encumbrance on capital retains.2 69
The court rationalized that under the bylaws of the Cooperative, the
Stahls had a "contractual right," in a non-technical sense, to the capital
retains. 270 Therefore, the Bank's financing statement adequately gave notice
to the public because it mentioned "contract rights arising from the sale
or other disposition of dairy products" in the description of the collateral. 27' Thus, the supreme court affirmed the district court's judgment. 272
V.

NOTES

A.

Status of Guarantors
During the survey period, the supreme court ruled that a personal
guarantor, by terms of an "assumption of indebtedness" agreement, did
not become a co-maker or co-debtor with the original note maker. 273
Under this rule, a subsequent release of the guarantors did not release
the original makers of the note to the extent of their right of contribution.
In Sunwest Bank of Farmington v. Kennedy, 27 4 Don, Sharon, Edith
and Troy Kennedy ("the Kennedys") borrowed $165,000 from Sunwest
Bank of Farmington ("Sunwest") in September of 1982.275 The use of
the funds was for Kennedy, Inc., a corporation owned by the Kennedys. 276
The corporation and the Kennedys were primarily liable for the note; in
addition, the Kennedys also each signed an "unconditional and continuing
guaranty" obligating them to "pay any and all liabilities, obligations or
indebtedness, of any kind or nature" of Kennedy, Inc. 277
In December 1984, the Kennedys sold their interest in Kennedy, Inc.
to James Copeland, James Clark, Charlie Craven, and Santex, Inc., the

266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 173, 793 P.2d at 855.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Sunwest Bank of Farmington v. Kennedy, 109 N.M. 400, 785 P.2d 740 (1990).
274. Id.
275. Id. The Kennedys actually borrowed the money from Valley Bank, the predecessor of Sunwest
Bank. Id. The note's original term was one year; however, Valley Bank and the Kennedys contemplated
annual renewals allowing the note to be repaid over a ten-year period. Id. The note was extended
twice, in September of 1983 and September of 1984. Id. at 401, 785 P.2d at 741.
276. Id. Kennedy, Inc.'s principal line of business was the operation of a car dealership. Id.
277. Id. at 400, 401, 785 P.2d at 740, 741.
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other defendants in the action. 27 81 The Kennedys remained both primarily

liable and liable as guarantors on the note. 279 Copeland, Clark and Craven
also executed personal guaranties on the payment of the note. 28 Copeland
and Clark eventually bought out the interests of Craven and Santex,
22
Inc. 2s1Sunwest subsequently released Craven from his personal guaranty.
The release of Craven's personal guaranty was done without any notice
to the Kennedys. 23 The parties subsequently defaulted on the note, and
Sunwest brought suit to collect the amount of over $100,000 still owed. 214
The district court granted summary judgment to Sunwest Bank. 285 The
Kennedys appealed. 286

The issue on appeal was whether Sunwest Bank, by releasing Craven
from his personal guaranty of the note without notice to the Kennedys,
effected a discharge of the Kennedys' liability on the note. 2 7 The Kennedys
argued that such a release by the holder of a note operates to discharge
the obligations of subsequent parties and co-debtors who are jointly and

severally bound, absent the maker's approval.2 88 The court decided the

of Craven
Kennedys' release from the note depended upon the 28elevation
9
and Santex to the status of co-maker or co-debtor.

The Kennedys argued that a maker of a note is a party who "engages
that he will pay the instrument according to its tenor at the time of his
engagement." 2 90 The Kennedys further asserted that Copeland and Craven,

when they assumed the indebtedness, became makers by agreeing to be
co-equal with the Kennedys. 291 The court decided, however, that because

neither Craven nor Santex was a party to the original agreement executed
between Sunwest and the Kennedys, neither Craven nor Santex was a
co-maker .292
Thus, the court stated, "[ilt is apparent ... that the Kennedys' argument that Craven and Santex were co-makers fails. ' 293 The court

determined that "[S]unwest's release of their [Craven and Santex] obligations is irrelevant to the Kennedys' on-going liability.'29

278. Id. at 401, 785 P.2d at 741.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.

282. Id. Sunwest released Craven from his personal guarantee in August 1985. Id. At the same
time, Kennedy, Inc., now doing business as Copeland-Craven Pontiac, Oldsmobile-Nissan, Inc.,
executed a modification of the note which contemplated amortizing the note over three years. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 400, 785 P.2d at 740.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 401, 785 P.2d at 741.
288. Id.; see Wood v. Eminger, 44 N.M. 636, 641, 107 P.2d 557, 560 (1940).
289. Kennedy, 109 N.M. at 401, 785 P.2d at 741.
290. Id. The Kennedys were quoting N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-3-413(1) (1978).
291. Kennedy, 109 N.M. at 401, 785 P.2d at 741.
292. Id. at 402, 785 P.2d at 742.
293. Id.
294. Id.
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B.

Materially Altered Obligation
An original maker of a note may be discharged from his obligation
if a material alteration is made in the renewal of the note without the
original maker's consent. 295 During the survey period, the supreme court
shed new light on the "material alteration" rule.
In addition to the argument in the preceding section in Sunwest Bank
of Farmington v. Kennedy, 296 the Kennedys argued that Sunwest Bank,
by releasing co-guarantors and by extending the time period for payment
of the note, 297 had materially altered the terms of the note without
the
298
Kennedys' consent, thus discharging the Kennedys' obligation.
The Kennedys contended that because Copeland and Clark extended
the note after the sale of Kennedy, Inc., the Kennedys should be discharged
from their liability. 299 The court distinguished this case from FirstNational
Bank in Albuquerque v. Abraham,3 °° the case that first stated the "material
30 1
alteration" rule. Abraham involved a renewal rather than an extension.
The court determined that the Kennedys should not be discharged from
their obligation because Copeland and Clark merely extended the note
as opposed to renewing it.3°2 Thus, the court affirmed the district court's
grant of summary judgment to Sunwest Bank. 303
C. Extent of Unwritten Condition on Guarantor's Liability
When dealing with a bank or savings and loan, individuals and businesses secure all agreements in writing. Under the Federal Deposit In304
surance Act:
No agreement which tends to diminish or defeat the . . . interest of
the [Federal Deposit Insurance] Corporation ("the FDIC") ... shall
be valid against the Corporation unless such agreement (1) shall be
in writing, (2) shall have been executed by the bank and the person
or persons claiming an adverse interest thereunder . . , (3) shall have
been approved by the board of directors of the bank or its loan
committee, which approval shall be reflected in the minutes of said
board or committee, and (4) shall have been, continuously,
from the
30 5
time of execution, an official record of the bank.
The above rule allows both federal and state bank examiners to rely
completely on a bank's records when evaluating its assets pursuant to
liquidation of assets or providing financing for purchases of assets and

295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.

Id.
109 N.M. 400, 785 P.2d 740 (1990).
See supra notes 249-56 and accompanying text.
Kennedy, 109 N.M. at 402, 785 P.2d at 742.
Id. at 403, 785 P.2d at 743.
97 N.M. 288, 639 P.2d 575 (1982).
Id.at 291, 639 P.2d at 578.
Kennedy, 109 N.M. at 403, 785 P.2d at 743.
Id.
12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1833 (1989).
Id. § 1823(e).
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liabilities by another bank. 3 °0 Usually, these evaluations must be made
with great speed in order to preserve the ongoing concern value of the
failed bank and avoid an interruption in banking services. 07 If unwritten
agreements were allowed, examiners' evaluations would not be accurate
because of the uncertainty involved in each transaction.3 8 In short, the
FDIC "does not simply step into the private shoes of the local
bank . . . ."0 So, in effect, an oral agreement between a bank officer
and an individual is not considered to be any agreement at all between
the FDIC and the individual.
In FDIC v. Alto Construction Co., Inc., 3 ° George Cliff, Thomas
Deason, George Slaughter, and Hal Cliff were the four shareholders of
Alto Construction Company, Inc. ("Alto")."' Hal Cliff was the president
and ran the day-to-day operations of the corporation. 12 George Cliff,
Deason, and Slaughter executed unlimited guaranties in favor of First
City National Bank ("First City") guaranteeing the indebtedness of Alto.3 3
Purportedly without the knowledge of the other shareholders of Alto,
Hal Cliff entered into a partnership on behalf of the corporation with
several other individuals and business entities.31 4 The resulting general
partnership was called the "Westsun Group" ("Westsun").31 5 Westsun
borrowed $178,000 from First City in return for a mortgage on a parcel
of land Westsun purchased.31 6 Hal Cliff and other Westsun partners gave
personal guaranties on the note. 1 7 George Cliff, Deason, and Slaughter
did not directly participate in these transactions, nor did they give guaranties specifically to secure the Westsun note.31 '
Westsun and Alto subsequently defaulted on various notes held by
First City.31 9 Deason and Slaughter met with the president of First City
to discuss the Westsun loan and the other outstanding obligations of
Alto.3 20 At this meeting, Deason and Slaughter acknowledged that the
Westsun note was an obligation of Alto, but the bank stated that it
intended to seek repayment only from those persons who signed guaranties
on behalf of Westsun .a21 Deason and Slaughter entered into an agreement
with the bank to restructure the three remaining notes and entered into

306. FDIC v. Alto Constr. Co., Inc., 109 N.M. 165, 168, 783 P.2d 475, 478 (1989).
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id. (quoting FDIC v. Tito Castro Constr. Co., 548 F. Supp. 1224, 1226 (D.P.R. 1982),
aff'd, 741 F.2d 475 (lst Cir. 1984)).
310. 109 N.M. 165, 783 P.2d 475 (1989).
311. Id.at 166, 783 P.2d at 476.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id.
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new guaranties to cover those notes.3 22 The Westsun
note was not covered
3 23
guaranties.
new
the
or
agreement
this
under
Subsequently, the FDIC closed the bank and began liquidating its
assets.3 24 The FDIC brought suit against the partners of Westsun, including
Alto Construction Company, George Cliff, Deason, and Slaughter for
foreclosure on the Westsun property and any deficiency remaining after
the foreclosure sale. 325 The district court granted FDIC's motion for
summary judgment on the individual liability of defendants George Cliff,
Deason, and Slaughter.3 26 George Cliff, Deason, and Slaughter appealed.3 27
The supreme court addressed whether George Cliff, Deason, and Slaughter intended the guaranties executed prior to the formation of Westsun
to secure Alto's obligations as one of Westsun's partners.3 28 George Cliff,
Deason, and Slaughter framed their argument in two ways. First, they
stated that they intended the guaranties to cover only those obligations
of Alto that related to its home building activities. 329 Because guaranties
are a species of contract, they argued, if there was no meeting of minds
over the subject of financial obligations unrelated to Alto's home building
activities, then the guaranties did not cover such activities and the FDIC
was precluded from enforcing the guaranties. 330 Second, George Cliff,
Deason, and Slaughter alleged that the bank understood and agreed that
the guaranties would only cover Alto's home building activities."3 The
court did find that the bank understood and agreed that the guaranties
would only cover Alto's home building activities; however, the court
applied the applicable federal law under the Federal Deposit Insurance
333
Act33 2 and concluded that summary judgment was proper.
The court found that under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, the
resulting unwritten condition alleged by George Cliff, Deason, and Slaughter, whether a secret agreement with the bank or their own unilateral
understanding, did not provide a defense against the FDIC.33 4 The court
reasoned that to do so would "tend to diminish or defeat the interest
of FDIC and mislead banking authorities as to the true status of a bank's
336
assets." '3 5 Thus, the court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 167, 783 P.2d at 477.
Id. Hal Cliff was not a party to the appeal. Id. at 166, 783 P.2d at 476.
Id. at 166, 783 P.2d at 476.
Id. at 167, 783 P.2d at 477.
Id.
Id.
Id.
12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1989).

333. Alto Construction Co., 109 N.M. at 168, 783 P.2d at 478.

334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 169, 783 P.2d at 479.
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AGENCY

Limitation on Attorney's Capacity to Pay Witness Fees
When an agent's authority from her principal is limited and that
limitation is communicated to a third person, the principal is not liable
337
to the third person for the agent's acts in excess of the limitation. In
addition, a person dealing with an agent is required to use reasonable
diligence and prudence in ascertaining the limits of the agent's authority.33
In Comstock v. Mitchell,339 the court addressed issues concerning limitations on an attorney's capacity to pay witness fees.
In Comstock, a40 Josephine Mitchell hired Ed Yudin to represent her
in a divorce action.3 41 Mitchell and Yudin hired Frederick Comstock, an
accountant, to testify on Mitchell's behalf.3 42 Through Yudin, Mitchell
paid Comstock $2,500 for his expert testimony.3 43 Subsequently, Comstock
billed Mitchell for nearly an additional $2,500. 44 Mitchell refused to pay
sued Mitchell in metropolitan
Comstock the additional fee.3 45 Comstock
346
court to recover the additional fee.
The metropolitan court held that Mitchell did not have to pay Comstock
the additional fee. 347 The metropolitan court found that Comstock had
failed to prove that Yudin, as Mitchell's agent, acted within the scope
4
of Mitchell's actual, express, implied, apparent or ostensible authority. 1
The court also found that Mitchell's testimony established that Yudin
acted outside the scope of his authority.3 49 In addition, the court found
that Comstock failed to make any inquiry into the extent of Yudin's
authority, even though Comstock knew or should have known that
3 50
Comstock's initial fees were paid by someone other than Mitchell.
Comstock appealed the metropolitan court's decision.35 The district court
affirmed the lower court's decision. 35 2 On appeal to the supreme court,
Comstock claimed error in the metropolitan court's findings and judg-

A.

ment .51

337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.

Chevron Oil Co. v. Sutton, 85 N.M. 679, 515 P.2d 1283 (1973).
Id.
110 N.M. 131, 793 P.2d 261 (1990).
Id.
Id. at 132, 793 P.2d at 262.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The supreme court addressed the issue of whether an agent, who had
indisputable authority to obligate the principal to pay witness fees of
$2,500, likewise had authority to pay fees to a witness in excess of that
sum. 3 54 Before addressing this issue, the court stated that a limitation of
the agent's authority by the principal, when communicated to a third
person, is effective to excuse the principal from liability to that third
person for acts by the agent in excess of the limit prescribed. 35 While
Mitchell may have shown that, insofar as Mitchell and Yudin were
concerned, Yudin had exceeded his authority, Mitchell failed to show
that she communicated to Comstock that Yudin's authority was limited
to $2,500.316
The court then addressed whether Comstock knew or should have
known that Mitchell and Yudin had agreed not to pay Comstock more
than $2,500, and whether Comstock acted undiligently and imprudently
in ascertaining what limits, if any, Mitchell imposed on Yudin. 3 7 The
supreme court held that Comstock was not obligated to prove that Yudin
did not exceed the limitation on Yudin's authority. 358 Rather, Mitchell
was obligated to prove that Yudin exceeded the limitation and that
Comstock knew or should have known through the exercise of due
diligence that Yudin exceeded the limitation. 359 The supreme court rested
its holding on two bases. First, the court explained that it is within the
implied authority of an attorney to bind his client for the fees of an
expert witness. 6° The court then explained that a person dealing with an
agent must use reasonable diligence and prudence to ascertain whether
the agent is acting within the scope of his powers.3 6' Thus, the court
remanded the case to the district court to determine whether Comstock
knew or through the exercise of due diligence should have known that
Yudin exceeded his authority in contracting with Comstock for witness

fees in excess of $2,500.62
B.

Agent Exoneration/Settlement
When claims of negligent or fraudulent misrepresentation and breach
of quasi-contract are based on agents' and principals' actions, agency
issues of tort, contract and vicarious liability may arise. In Gallegos v.

354. Id.
355. Id. (quoting 3 AM. JUR. 2D Agency § 82 (1986)).

356.
357.
358.
359.
360.

Id. at 133, 793 P.2d at 263.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Klein v. Boylan, 115 N.J.L. 295, 179 A. 638 (1935); Herfurth v. Horaine, 266

Ky. 19, 98 S.W.2d 21 (1936); Portnow v. Berg, 593 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. Ct. App. 1980)).

361. Id.
362. Id. at 134, 793 P.2d at 264. The court stated that if the answer was yes, then the metropolitan
court's judgment in Mitchell's favor was affirmed. However, if the answer was no, then the court
would answer the following question: Were Comstock's fees above $2,500 reasonable? If the answer
was no, then the court would enter judgment in an amount found to be reasonable. If the answer
was yes, then the court would enter judgment in favor of Comstock for the excess fees he charged.
Id. at 133, 793 P.2d at 263.
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Citizens Insurance Agency,3 63 Max Sanchez and Amadeo Tenorio were
equal partners in Citizens Insurance Agency ("Citizens"). 3 " Prior to May
1984, Robert Gonzales began soliciting insurance on behalf of Citizens. 65
Gonzales procured an auto insurance application and a premium check
from Fernando and Frances Gallegos on May 12, 1984. 366 One month
after the transaction, Emilio Aragon acquired the entirety of Tenorio's
partnership interest in Citizens.167 Meanwhile, the Gallegoses never received
their policy or proof of financial responsibility from Citizens and were
involved in two auto accidents.168 Citizens informed the Gallegoses that
Citizens had not procured an insurance policy for the Gallegoses and
that the Gallegoses were uninsured.3 69 Although Citizens offered to rethe full amount of their premium, the premium
imburse the Gallegoses
370
was never refunded.
The Gallegoses brought an action against the insurance agency, the
37 ,
partners (Sanchez and Tenorio or Aragon), and the agent (Gonzales).
372 The
Following a jury trial, the jury found in favor of Gonzales.
373
Gallegoses settled with Tenorio. The trial court entered judgment against
Sanchez in the sum of $2,000 for compensatory damages and $8,000 for
for the
punitive damages. 374 Judgment was also entered against Aragon
3
75
apAragon
same amounts of compensatory and punitive damages.
.376
pealed
The supreme court addressed the preliminary question of whether Gonzales was an agent for Citizens at the time he negotiated the contract
with the Gallegoses .77 The court held that there was substantial evidence
that Gonzales acted on behalf of Citizens as either its actual agent or
and that a contract existed between the
under its apparent authority
71
Citizens.
and
Gallegoses
The court then addressed issues dealing with the liability of the agent
for failing to issue a policy. First, the court addressed whether exoneration
of an agent extinguished the principal's liability. 379 Aragon asserted that
his liability was extinguished by virtue of the jury verdict in favor of

363.
364.
365.
366.

108 N.M. 722, 779 P.2d 99 (1989).
Id. at 724, 779 P.2d at 101.
Id.
Id. at 725, 779 P.2d at 102.

367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 725, 726, 779 P.2d at 102, 103. The Gallegos' claims were breach of an automobile
insurance contract and retention of an insurance premium (unjust enrichment), or quasi-contract,
and claims of negligent or fraudulent misrepresentation. Id.
372. Id. at 727, 779 P.2d at 104.
373. Id.at 730, 779 P.2d at 107.
374. Id. at 727, 779 P.2d at 104.
375. Id.
376. Id. at 728, 779 P.2d at 105.
377. Id. at 729, 779 P.2d at 106.
378. Id.
379. Id.
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Gonzales.380 Aragon relied upon the theory that exoneration of the servant
operates in tort to exonerate the principal of vicarious liability.38' In
resolving the issue of Aragon's liability, the court found that the evidence
supported the contention that Aragon was directly, not vicariously, responsible for the failure to provide the Gallegoses with the automobile
insurance they purchased.31 2 Further, the court applied agency theories
for contracts and found Aragon liable even though a jury had exonerated
Gonzales.3" 3 The court held that under breach of contract, it was not
inconsistent to place liability upon the principal and to exonerate the
agent. 84 Furthermore, the court held that an agent is not liable for the
disclosed principal's breach of contract unless he expressly was made a
party to
the contract or unless his conduct indicated an intent to be
3 85
bound.
The court also addressed whether the Gallegoses' settlement with Tenorio extinguished Aragon's tort liability.8 6 Aragon asserted that the set38 7
tlement between the Gallegoses and Tenorio extinguished his liability.
In resolving the settlement issue, the court held that the settlement with
Tenorio for any alleged tortious conduct on his part would have no
effect upon the tort liability of Aragon as a consequence of Aragon's

own actions.8

The court reasoned that if Tenorio's liability was joint

and several under New Mexico's release statute,38 9 a release would not
discharge other tortfeasors unless the release so provided. 9° The issue of
release, however, was not previously raised and preserved.3 9 1
VII.

JOINT VENTURE/PARTNERSHIP

During the survey period, the concept of a joint venture was developed
to expand partnership law principles to organizations which fail to meet

380. Id. at 730, 779 P.2d at 107.
381. Id.; see also Harrison v. Lucero, 86 N.M. 581, 525 P.2d 941 (Ct. App. 1974).
382. Gallegos, 108 N.M. at 730, 779 P.2d at 107.
383. Id.
384. Id.; see Barnes v. Sadler Assocs., Inc., 95 N.M. 334, 622 P.2d 239 (1981).
385. Gallegos, 108 N.M. at 730, 779 P.2d at 107; see Otero v. Wheeler, 102 N.M. 770, 701
P.2d 369 (1985).
386. Gallegos, 108 N.M. at 730, 779 P.2d at 107.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Under N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-4 (Repl. Pamp. 1989), a release by the injured person of
one joint tortfeasor, whether before or after judgment, does not discharge the other tortfeasors
unless the release so provides; but it reduces the claim against the other tortfeasors in the amount
of the consideration paid for the release, or in any amount or proportion by which the release
provides that the total claim shall be reduced, if greater than the consideration paid.
390. Gallegos, 108 N.M. at 730, 779 P.2d at 107.
391. Id. The court refused to address whether it would follow the common law treatment of
joint contract liability that a release of one joint obligor on a contract operates to release all
obligers, or whether it would follow the modern approach to the treatment of joint contract liability
that where two or more obligors are jointly liable for breach, a release of one does not necessarily
release the other. Id. In addition, the court refused to address joint contract liability because Aragon's
motion to dismiss the action was premised on the ground that Tenorio was an indispensable party
and not on the ground that Tenorio's settlement operated to discharge all joint obligors. Id.
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the technical requirements of a partnership. 9 2 A joint venture is usually
limited to carrying out a single transaction or a series of related transactions, while a partnership is formed for the purpose of carrying on a
continuous business.3 93 The current trend is to include joint ventures as
a recognized type of partnership, rather than a separate but analogous
business organization. 94 In In re Groff v. Citizens Bank of Clovis,3 95 the
court applied partnership law to a joint venture in continuation of that
trend.
In In re Groff,196 to secure a debt, Lee and Gwen Groff gave Citizens
Bank of Clovis ("Citizens Bank") a security interest in specified cattle
3 97
owned by the Groffs, as well as all cattle the Groffs later acquired.
Without Citizens Bank's knowledge, Lee Groff entered into a cattlefeeding venture with Ed Pickering.3 98 Groff and Pickering purchased cattle
from Agri-Tech Services, Inc., with Morgan County Feeders, Inc. providing the purchase money financing. 3 99 Subsequently, the Groffs filed
for bankruptcy.4 A priority dispute ensued and an action was brought
to determine
the priority of the Groffs' creditors to the Groff-Pickering
401
cattle.
The bankruptcy court held that Groff and Pickering were involved in
a joint venture and that the cattle were property of the joint venture.4 2
The bankruptcy court also held that New Mexico partnership law applies
to joint ventures and, under New Mexico law, Citizens Bank, as a creditor
of the Groffs in their individual capacity only, did not hold an interest
in the Groff-Pickering cattle. 403 The bankruptcy court concluded that the
Groffs' bankruptcy estate did not contain the Groff-Pickering cattle; the
estate contained only the Groffs' interest in the Groff-Pickering joint
venture as determined under New Mexico partnership law. 4°4 Citizens
Bank appealed to the United States District Court.405 The trial court
affirmed the decision of the bankruptcy court. 406 Citizens Bank appealed. 407
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit examined
the issue of whether the rules governing partners' interests in partnership

392. A. BROMBERG & L. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP

§

1.01(b), at 1:5

(1988).
393. Id. at §§ 2.06(a), 2:42-43.
394. H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY,
266, at 446 (1979).
395. 898 F.2d 1475 (10th Cir. 1990).
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. Id. at 1476.
401. Id.
402. Id.
403. Id.

404. Id.
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. Id.
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assets also apply to joint ventures.4 8 The court of appeals, applying New
Mexico partnership law, held that a creditor with a security interest in
a debtor's presently owned and after-acquired cattle had no interest in
the cattle subsequently acquired by the debtor's joint venture with a third
party. 409
The court of appeals rested its holding on three bases. First, the history
of a joint venture was discussed. 41 0 The American judiciary developed
the concept of a joint venture in order to extend principles of partnership
law to organizations that fail to meet the technical requirements of a
partnership. 41 Second, the court discussed the current trend in the treatment of joint ventures. 4 2 The current trend is to include joint ventures
as a recognized type of partnership rather than a distinct but similar
414
business entity. 413 Third, the court applied New Mexico partnership law.
Under the Uniform Partnership Act, 4 5 the partnership owns property as
an entity separate and distinct from the partners. 4 6 Individual partners
47
can only assign their residual interests in the entire partnership.
VIII.

DIRECTOR INDEMNIFICATION

Stockholders may obtain relief in equity against fraud or breach of
trust by officers or directors who wrongfully deal with property to the
injury of the stockholders. 4 11 In Petty v. Bank of New Mexico Holding
Co.,419 the court addressed whether a minority shareholder may seek relief
for a claim of breach of fiduciary duty against the directors and officers
of a corporation for an alleged wrongful indemnification.
In Petty, Ralph Petty purchased fifty shares, less than one percent of
the total outstanding shares, in the Bank of New Mexico Holding Company ("the Holding Company") on September 23, 1987.420 One week
later, Petty sent a written protest to the Holding Company demanding
that the Holding Company refrain from incurring any further litigation
expenses in a separate, pending lawsuit. 421 The litigation involved a suit

408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.

Id.
Id. at 1478.
Id. at 1476.
Id.
Id. at 1477.
Id.; see supra note 364.
In re Groff, 898 F.2d at 1477.
415. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 54-1-1 to -43 (Repl. Pamp. 1988).
416. In re Groff, 898 F.2d at 1477. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 54-1-8 (Repl. Pamp. 1988) states in
pertinent part:
A. All property originally brought into the partnership stock or subsequently
acquired by purchase or otherwise, on account of the partnership, is partnership
property.
B. Unless the contrary intention appears, property acquired with partnership funds
is partnership property.
417. In re Groff, 898 F.2d at 1477.
418. 19 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 2262, at 161 (1986).
419. 109 N.M. 524, 787 P.2d 443 (1990).
420. Id. at 526, 787 P.2d at 445.
421. Id.
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by a minority shareholder, Lanford, against the president and chief
executive officer of the Holding Company, against other shareholders of
the Holding Company, and against the Holding Company itself, for a
determination of the price at which shares of stock in the corporation
should be bought and sold pursuant to the buy-sell and voting trust
agreement. 42 2 Petty was not a party to the Lanford litigation because he
was not a shareholder at that time.423 On October 1, 1987, subsequent
to Petty's purchase of stock, the Holding Company authorized reimbursement of its officers and directors for their legal fees, costs and
expenses incurred in the defense of the litigation. 424 Petty filed a derivative
suit against the Holding Company and its officers and directors. 42 1 Petty
alleged that the use of any Holding Company funds to defend the litigation
was improper, that litigation expenses could not be reimbursed by the
Holding Company, and that any judgment against the directors in the
litigation could not be reimbursed to any defendant. 426 The trial court
dismissed the complaint for failure 42to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted. 427 Petty appealed.
The supreme court addressed two issues. First, the court considered
whether Petty's complaint was sufficient to state a cause of action on
behalf of the corporation for the allegedly wrongful indemnification of
the officers and directors. 429 The supreme court held that Petty's complaint
alleged sufficient facts to state a claim against the officers and directors
for breach of their fiduciary duty. 4 0 The court rested its holding on two
bases. First, the defendants were adequately apprised of the nature of
the corporation's claim, asserted derivatively through Petty . 41 Defendants
were notified, by virtue of Petty's allegations, that defendants had breached
their fiduciary duty, or otherwise acted wrongfully, in authorizing the
officers' and directors' indemnification by the corporation of their litigation expenses. 4 2 Second, an action on behalf of the corporation to
seek reimbursement for distributions by the corporation resulting from
the defendants' breach of their fiduciary duty, or other duty owed to
the corporation and the minority shareholders, does exist. 433
The second issue addressed by the supreme court, an issue of first
impression in New Mexico, was whether the corporation had the power
to indemnify its directors. 4 4 The supreme court held that New Mexico's
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indemnification statute, 43" which empowers a corporation to indemnify
any person made a party to a proceeding by reason of his status as
director, was inapplicable to the Holding Company's action with respect
to the defendants in the litigation.4 36 The court rested its holding on two
bases. First, the indemnification statute did not apply to the Holding
Company's actions indemnifying the directors because the defendants
were not made parties to the litigation as a result of the defendants'
status as directors of the corporation. 437 Rather, the defendants were
made parties to that suit because they were shareholders in the Holding
Company and signatories to the buy-sell and voting stock agreement.438
Second, the indemnification statute is an enabling statute which operates
43 9
to empower corporations to indemnify their directors and other agents.
The indemnification statute, however, does not confer 0 on the indemnified
director an unquestionable right to indemnification.4
IX.

UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICE

In Thompson v. Youart,"'1 Ernest Thompson, a furniture designermanufacturer, began selling his furniture in 1982 to Schelu, a gallery
which sells southwestern-style furniture owned by Tim and Jai Youart
("the Youarts"). 442 In 1988, the Youarts decided to carry a new line of
furniture in place of Thompson's furniture line because of alleged problems with receiving special orders from Thompson, and because of Thompson's placement of advertisements which competed with Schelu's
advertisements."43 The new line of furniture sold by Schelu was similar
to Thompson's.4 " Schelu announced the new furniture line in a radio
advertisement."45 Thompson filed a petition, complaint and order to show
cause why the gallery owners should not be enjoined from selling the
new line. 44 In a letter ruling, the trial court held that Thompson's furniture
designs had aesthetic value which belonged to Thompson and which
deserved some degree of protection."47 The trial court communicated its

435. Under N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-4.1(B) (Supp. 1991), a corporation shall have the power
to indemnify any person made a party to any proceeding by reason of the fact that the person is
or was a director, if three conditions are met.
436. Petty, 109 N.M. at 529, 787 P.2d at 448.
437. Id. at 528, 787 P.2d at 447.
438. Id.
439. Id. at 530, 787 P.2d at 449.
440. Id. The court remanded the case to consider whether the directors had breached their fiduciary
duty to the corporation or had otherwise failed to adhere to the various standards of conduct
required of corporate directors in the management of their corporations. Id. at 531, 787 P.2d at
450. In addition, the court commented that the directors' claim that this action was premature was
predicated on the applicability of the indemnification statute, and if the statute did not apply, then
the case might be ripe and not premature. Id. at 533, 787 P.2d at 452.
441. 109 N.M. 572, 787 P.2d 1255 (Ct. App. 1990).
442. Id. at 574, 787 P.2d at 1257.
443. Id.
444. Id.
445. Id.
446. Id.
447. Id.
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intent to grant a temporary restraining order prohibiting the gallery owners
from selling furniture which was deceptively similar to Thompson's furniture line." 8 The trial court based its decision on the court's duty to
prevent trade practices that are unfair and overreaching."49 The trial court
certified the order for interlocutory appeal.4 5 °
The court of appeals addressed whether a furniture designer-manufacturer has a right to prevent a gallery from selling furniture similar to
the furniture line of the designer-manufacturer where no furniture copyright exists and no exclusive contract to sell the designer-manufacturer's
furniture line exists. 45' The court held that the gallery owners did not
misrepresent the source of the new furniture line so as to confuse the
public; rather, Schelu announced the switch in furniture lines. 452 The
court applied the Unfair Practices Act to Thompson's claim. 453 The court
stated that it could not distinguish Thompson's common law claim of
unfair competition from a claim under the Unfair Practices Act. 4 4 Under
45 6
the Act, none of the elements 455 for an unfair practice claim were present.
The court also held that the designs used by Thompson were in the
public domain and could be copied freely absent protection by a patent
or copyright.4 57 The court reasoned that the mere inability of the public
to tell two identical articles apart is not enough to support an injunction
against copying that federal patent law permits. 45 1 If no exclusive right
to a product or to the use of designs exists, mere copying by another
45 9
does not constitute unfair competition.
The court also addressed whether the designer-manufacturer's claim
was preempted by federal law.460 The court held that Thompson's claim,
which sought protection against copying designs, was preempted by federal
law and came under the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts.'46
The court reasoned that the right to prevent copying is a right protected
by federal copyright laws. 462 Those rights governed by federal copyright
laws are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. 4 3

448. Id. at 575, 787 P.2d at 1258.
449. Id.
450. Id.
451. Id.
452. Id. at 576, 787 P.2d at 1259.
453. Id. at 575, 787 P.2d at 1258.
454. Id.
455. Under N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-2(C) (Supp. 1991), the relevant elements for a claim under
the Unfair Practices Act are: (1) a false or misleading representation; (2) knowingly made; (3) in
connection with the sale of goods or services; (4) in the regular course of trade or commerce; (5)
which may, tends to or does deceive or mislead any person.
456. Thompson, 109 N.M. at 576, 787 P.2d at 1259.
457. Id. at 577, 787 P.2d at 1260.
458. Id. (citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232 (1964)).
459. Id. at 576, 787 P.2d at 1259 (quoting Gardenia Flowers, Inc. v. Joseph Markovits, Inc.,
280 F. Supp. 776 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)).
460. Id. at 575, 787 P.2d at 1258.
461. Id. at 577, 787 P.2d at 1260.
462. Id.
463. Id.
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X.

GROSS RECEIPTS TAX

The gross receipts tax in effect operates as a tax on the sale of goods
and services.4" The gross receipts tax and a retail sales tax are both
collected by the seller; however, the gross receipts tax is imposed on the
seller and is customarily passed to the buyer, while the sales tax is
imposed directly on the buyer." 5
In El Centro Villa Nursing Center v. Taxation and Revenue Department
of New Mexico,"6 El Centro Villa Nursing Center ("El Centro") received
payments from the Department of Human Services in December 1983
and November 1984 and failed to inquire as to El Centro's tax liability
from these payments.0 7 El Centro failed to pay gross receipts tax on
these payments." El Centro admitted that the cause of its failure to pay
tax was an inadvertent error." 9 El Centro appealed the penalty assessment
for its failure to pay the gross receipts tax applicable to these payments.4 70
The decision and order of the hearing officer of the Taxation and
Revenue Department ("the Department") upheld the penalty assessed
against El Centro for failure to pay gross receipts tax. 47' The hearing
officer held that El Centro's failure to pay the tax was negligent. 472 The
hearing officer based his holding on the presumption that the Department's
under New Mexico's
determination that a penalty should be assessed
474 El Centro appealed. 475
473
gross receipts penalty statute was correct.
The court of appeals addressed two issues. The first issue the court
addressed was whether there was substantial evidence to support a penalty
assessment against El Centro under section 7-1-69(A) for failure to pay
gross receipts tax due to El Centro's negligence. 476 The court held that
there was sufficient evidence to find that El Centro's failure to pay tax
was due to El Centro's negligence. 477 The court rested its decision on
three bases. First, under New Mexico's administrative regulations, 478 a
penalty may be imposed upon a taxpayer for inadvertent failure to pay

464. United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, 721 (1982).
465. Yesley, Out of Sight But Not Out of Mind: New Mexico's Tax on Out-of-State Services,
20 N.M.L. REV. 501, 502 n.6 (1990).
466. 108 N.M. 795, 779 P.2d 982 (Ct. App. 1989).
467. Id. at 796, 779 P.2d at 983.
468. Id. at 795, 779 P.2d at 982. New Mexico's gross receipts tax is imposed under the Gross
Receipts and Compensating Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-9-1 to -82 (Supp. 1991).
469. El Centro, 108 N.M. at 798, 779 P.2d at 985.
470. Id. at 795, 779 P.2d at 982.
471. Id.

472. Id.
473. Under N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-1-69(A) (Supp. 1991), in the case of a failure due to negligence
or disregard of rules and regulations, but without intent to defraud, to pay when due any amount
of tax required to be paid, or to file by the date required regardless of whether any tax is due,
a penalty, specified in the statute, is applied.
474. El Centro, 108 N.M. at 795, 779 P.2d at 982.
475. Id.
476. Id.
477. Id. at 796, 779 P.2d at 983.
478. N.M. Tax Reg. 69:3(3) (1990) states, "[tfaxpayer 'negligence' under Section 7-1-69(A) means:
inadvertence, indifference, thoughtlessness, carelessness, erroneous belief or inattention."
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tax. 479 El Centro admitted that the cause of its failure to pay the tax

was inadvertent error, thereby admitting that the cause was negligent as
defined by administrative regulations.4 0° Second, under New Mexico's
administrative regulations, 48' a penalty may be imposed upon a taxpayer

for his inaction if action would reasonably be required.412 El Centro's
failure to specifically bring the unusual and large payments to its accountant's attention constituted inaction.4 3 Third, under New Mexico's
administrative regulations," a penalty may be imposed for a taxpayer's
failure to act with ordinary business care and prudence under the cir-

cumstances.4 85 El Centro's efforts to exercise ordinary business care and

prudence by setting up and actively participating in an accounting system
failed to account for large and unusual increases in 6 gross receipts and,
therefore, was inadequate under the circumstances.4

The second issue addressed by the court of appeals was whether El
Centro's failure to pay tax was due in part to El Centro's accountant's
negligence in implementing El Centro's accounting system.487 The court
held that although there was sufficient evidence to support the finding
that El Centro's failure to pay tax was due as much to El Centro's
inattention as to the negligence of its accountant, the court was not
inclined to hold that a taxpayer can abdicate its responsibility merely by
appointing an accountant as an agent in tax matters.48 The court followed
the decision in Tiffany Construction Co. v. Bureau of Revenue, 4 9 which

held that "every person is charged with the reasonable duty to ascertain
the possible tax consequences of his action [or inaction]. ' 49
XI.

COMPENSATING TAX

In Phillips Mercantile Co. v. Taxation and Revenue Department of

New Mexico, 49 1 Phillips Mercantile Company ("Phillips") contracted with

the Albuquerque Journal/Tribune and the Santa Fe New Mexican to
distribute newspaper inserts. 492 The inserts were shipped directly from the

479. El Centro, 108 N.M. at 797, 779 P.2d at 984.
480. Id. at 798, 779 P.2d at 985.
481. N.M. Tax Reg. 69:3(2) (1990) states, "[t]axpayer 'negligence' under Section 7-1-69(A) means:
inaction by taxpayers where action is required."
482. El Centro, 108 N.M. at 798, 779 P.2d at 985.
483. Id.
484. N.M. Tax Reg. 69:3(1) (1990) states, "[taxpayer 'negligence' under Section 7-1-69(A) means:
failure to exercise that degree of ordinary business care and prudence which reasonable taxpayers
would exercise under like circumstances."
485. El Centro, 108 N.M. at 798, 779 P.2d at 985.
486. Id.
487. Id.
488. Id. at 799, 779 P.2d at 986.
489. 90 N.M. 16, 558 P.2d 1155 (1976).
490. El Centro, 108 N.M. at 799, 779 P.2d at 986 (quoting Tiffany Constr. Co. v. Bureau of
Revenue, 90 N.M. 16, 17, 558 P.2d 1155, 1156 (Ct. App. 1976)).
491. 109 N.M. 487, 786 P.2d 1221 (Ct. App. 1990).
492. Id. at 488, 786 P.2d at 1222.
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printers to the newspapers.4 93 Phillips also contracted with a mailing
service in Albuquerque to address and mail catalogs to New Mexico
residents. 494 Phillips had ninety percent of the catalogs shipped to the
Albuquerque mailing service and ninety-nine percent of the newspaper
5
inserts shipped to the New Mexico newspapers. 49 The remainder of the
catalogs and inserts were shipped to Phillips' retail stores for use in those
Mexico ("the
stores. 49 The Taxation and Revenue Department of New
497
Department") assessed a compensating tax on Phillips.
The Secretary of the Department issued a decision and an order upon the
holding the assessment of the compensating tax against Phillips
49a
Phillips
.
value of catalogs and newspaper inserts purchased by Phillips
appealed the decision and order. 4
The court of appeals addressed two issues. The court addressed whether
Phillips' contracting for the distribution of the catalogs and newspaper
inserts was a taxable "use"'' 0 of them. 01 The court of appeals analyzed2
50
Phillips' transaction under New Mexico's statute on compensating tax.
The court held that Phillips had used the advertising materials distributed
0
in New Mexico within the meaning of section 7-9-7.5 3 The court rested
its decision on two bases. First, Phillips had a contractual relationship
with the Albuquerque mailing service used to address and mail the catalogs
to New Mexico residents.5 ° Second, Phillips had a contractual relationship
with the New Mexico newspapers through which it directed the manner
and timing of the distribution of its newspaper inserts to New Mexico
residents.505 Thus, by exercising control over the catalogs and inserts
through its contractual relationships with the mailing service and the
newspapers in New Mexico, Phillips used the advertising material within
the meaning of section 7-9-7.506
The court also addressed whether Phillips should be allowed a deduction
from gross receipts tax under New Mexico's deduction from gross receipts
statute. 0 7 The court held that Phillips' newspaper inserts were advertising
and did not constitute newspapers.1 8 Thus, the deductions from gross
493. Id.
494. Id.
495. Id.

496. Id.
497. Id. at 487, 786 P.2d at 1221.

498. Id.
499. Id.
500. Under N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-3(L) (Supp. 1991), for the purposes of the Gross Receipts
and Compensating Act, "use" or "using" includes use, consumption or storage, other than storage
for subsequent sale in the ordinary course of business, or for use solely outside of New Mexico.
501. Phillips, 109 N.M. at 488, 786 P.2d at 1222.
502. Id. at 488-489, 786 P.2d at 1222-23. Under N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-7 (Supp. 1991), for the
privilege of using property in New Mexico, there is imposed an excise tax equal to five percent of
the value of the property under certain circumstances.
503. Phillips, 109 N.M. at 489, 786 P.2d at 1223.
504. Id.
505. Id.
506. Id.
507. Id. Under N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-9-63 (Supp. 1991), receipts from publishing newspapers or
magazines, except from selling advertising space, may be deducted from gross receipts.
508. Phillips, 109 N.M. at 489, 786 P.2d at 1223.
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receipts tax allowed by New Mexico's statute did not operate to shield

Phillips from the compensating tax.5 09 The court based its decision on
a New Mexico gross receipts regulation10 which provides that, as used
in section 7-9-63, the term "newspaper" is limited to publications commonly understood to be newspapers and printed and distributed periodically at daily, weekly, or other short intervals for the dissemination

of news of a general character and of a general interest. 5" In addition,
advertising is not considered to be news of a general character and of
a general interest.5 2 Therefore, the taxpayer's contracting for the distribution of catalogs and newspaper inserts was a taxable use of the catalogs
53
and inserts1.
RUBEN ARVIZU III
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509. Id. at 490, 786 P.2d at 1224.
510. N.M. Gross Receipts Reg. 64:1 (1989) states:
As used in Sections 7-9-63 and 7-9-64, the term 'newspaper' is limited to those
publications which are commonly understood to be newspapers and which are
printed and distributed periodically at daily, weekly, or other short intervals for
the dissemination of news of a general character and of a general interest. The
term does not include handbills, circulars, flyers, or the like, unless printed and
distributed as a part of a publication which otherwise constitutes a newspaper within
the meaning of this paragraph. Neither does the term include any publication which
is issued to supply information on certain subjects of interest to particular groups,
unless such publication otherwise qualifies as a newspaper within the meaning of
this paragraph. Advertising is not considered to be news of a general character
and of a general interest.
511. Phillips, 109 N.M. at 489-90, 786 P.2d 1223-24.
512. Id. at 489, 786 P.2d at 1223.
513. Id. at 489-90, 786 P.2d at 1223-24.

